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The new italian issue of max scheler der formalismus in der ethik und die 
materiale Wertethik. neuer Versuch der grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus 
is published by Bompiani and edited by Roberta Guccinelli (2013). Guccinelli 
new italian translation replaces the last one, edited by giancarlo caronello 
with Edizioni San Paolo in 1996, and features a double language text as well 
as an enriched subject index.
with the exception of rare cases1, scheler thought has been ideologically 
read and understood in Italy almost until 1996, as it sometimes happens 
unfairly and unfortunately with the best authors. Specifically Scheler 
works have been partially abused by the magisterium of catholic church to 
justify some dogma; consequently unlucky and non genuine translations 
have often been released. some of them include categories which are not 
adherent to original scheler thought. guccinelli translation aims to give 
new life to schelerian contribution, letting the “things themselves” speak, 
as the author did. The challenge was hard, but the result is a translation in 
plain language, where every term is balanced with the others and lexical 
care corresponds to conceptual clarity.
scheler’s formalism is a continent, the new translation gives voice to. 
guccinelli new edition vastly introduces it to the reader 2. since it is 
practically impossible to consider here all the aspects of schelerian ethics, 
i will focus on a single topic, which represents the core of schelerian ethics, 
as Guccinelli says. It is the concept of “individual essence”, identified 
by the translator with the correlate of “the betrayed beatitude and love 
experience” each person can experience during his life. such experience 
provides the leit motiv of guccinelli introduction to the formalism new 
edition. 
‘individual essence’ is the concept starting from which scheler revises and 
expands Kantian ethics. Scheler identifies Kant with the only philosopher 
who has really attempted to give a foundation to ethics in the modern age. 
nevertheless scheler goes further and tries to provide a new foundation of 
ethics (and of the practical thought in general), the most complete we still have 
in the twenty-first century. The brief present contribution aims to highlight the 
1  See De Monticelli (2013).
2  See Guccinelli (2013).
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innovation of scheler ethics, being aware that scheler thought and productions 
are ampler than a mere criticism of Kant, as guccinelli points out in her essay.
Trying to explain scheler criticism of Kant in a few words, it is worth 
pointing out the modernity of Kantian concept of autonomy, that is the idea 
according to which the man is law to himself and neither god nor natural 
law nor particular goods or ends give law to him. nevertheless the further 
Kantian idea according to which the rational will determines the concepts 
of good, and not vice-versa, is not so modern. To scheler, if Kant could 
overcome theological voluntarism, he could not overcome voluntarism tout 
court. in this way, Kant comes to the “paradox” of an ethics which is not 
founded since good will has not corresponding evidence in feeling. The 
main problem of Kantian ethics is having barred emotional life from the 
rationality sphere, whose enlargement is the most original contribution of 
schelerian ethics.
Kantian emotional life exclusion from ethics is connected with Kantian 
worry that an ethics of feeling could lead to an ethics of goods or ends or 
to the eudemonism in all its declinations. scheler criticizes this passage 
maintaining that not everything that is “material” is reducible to particular 
goods or ends: values are not reducible to these last ones and we can have 
cognitive access to them. 
for scheler Kantian ethics is indifferent to the existence of value-qualities 
and of their corresponding normative features. a development of Kantian 
ethics is possible only if the prejudice, according to which the existence of 
a “formal a-priori” but not the existence of a “material a-priori” is justified, 
is overcome. scheler agrees with Kant that ethics cannot be empirically 
founded, since – to be ethics –  it requires a universal feature. In the same 
way scheler shares with Kant the criticism of the ethics of goods and 
ends and of the eudemonism in all its declinations, since such ethics are 
empirical. nevertheless, differently from Kant, scheler argues that not only 
the epistemological property, concerning the nature of the moral evidence 
– “the moral law inside me” –  but also the “type-structure of objects in the big 
spheres of experience” (Scheler 1916, 151), is a-priori (from formalism to a 
material ethics).
schelerian material ethics has important implications both a parte 
subiecti and a parte obiecti. a parte subiecti it opens to feeling, the mode 
of intentionality concerning emotions. By virtue of feeling, the subject 
structures his own order of values. a parte obiecti scheler material ethics 
opens to values as essential qualities of things given through feeling as a 
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mode of access to reality. universal axiological world is hierarchical but 
not undynamic: laws of essence identify hierarchical relationships between 
spheres of value (from the higher to the lower: values of pleasure, vital 
values, values of the person, value of the holy), but they do not prescribe 
particular goods or ends. as already to Kant, to scheler the autonomy, the 
faculty of the individual to structure his own order of values, ought to 
be respected. nevertheless, according to scheler this faculty ought to be 
respected precisely by virtue of two discoveries unknown to Kant (because 
of his emotional life exclusion from ethics): a parte subiecti, the discovery of 
the commitment that emotional life implies for the person, since it provides 
the place of the “individual essence” flourishing; a parte obiecti the discovery 
of the value spheres variety and richness, the access to which legal systems 
should extend so that more and more people could flourish. 
The concept of “individual essence” extends Kantian concepts of person 
and human dignity, providing the testing ground for schelerian new 
foundation of ethics (and practical thought in general), also interesting for 
its implications on law. 
scheler shares with Kant the concept of person as a whole non-reducible 
to parts or data, as well as the Kantian concept of human dignity as 
irreducibility of the person to physical-psychical and social data. Kantian – 
and also Schelerian – concept of human dignity justifies the duty to never 
treat the person merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time 
as an end. nevertheless, scheler does not share with Kant the idea that the 
essential trait of personality should be identified with the potential capacity 
of morality or even with the morality itself. according to scheler this idea 
brings Kant to identify the person with the x of an abstract rational activity, 
rather than with the concrete individual. The individual is essentially 
characterized by his acts, first of all the act of feeling: the person, before 
being an ens cogitans or an ens volens, is an ens amans3. if the person is 
identified with the X of an abstract rational activity, the risk is that the 
respect of person is identified with the respect of “humanity” or “morality”, 
rather than with the respect of the concrete individual, as scheler 
underlines. Paradoxically the risk is that Kantian ethics may suggest a 
concept of human dignity as a limit of autonomy, with dramatic consequences 
for law, where the respect of autonomy was Kantian ethics starting point. 
According to Scheler, a person should not be identified with the abstract 
activity of rationality [Vernunftperson] but with the concrete individual 
who accesses the world of values and who reveals in his particular access 
3  This famous statement appears in scheler (1913).
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an “individual essence” [individuelle Wesen], the flourishing of which engages 
the individual. in other words, scheler opinion, autonomy is safeguarded if 
it grants the possibility for men to flourish rather than prescribing moral 
duties to themselves. 
in addition to the general trait of personality, schelerian enlargement 
of human dignity Kantian concept highlights an eudemonological trait4: 
the beatitude for the individual to be himself. The enlargement opens to 
a phenomenology of self-acknowledgement which the experience of the 
betrayed beatitude and love reveals, as guccinelli explains in her essay. 
This beatitude passes through anguish, as a philosopher of the last century 
reminds, asking herself what kind of self- perspective a person could have at 
the end of his life5. 
furthermore the importance accorded to beatitude by scheler does not imply 
that schelerian ethics is eudemonistic. scheler also considers a deontic trait of 
human dignity: each person ought to be granted the possibility to realize his 
own order of values insofar as he recognizes the same possibility to the other6. 
This point is so interesting in the perspective of a plural universalism that 
someone defined Scheler a theorist of multiculturalism7. in my opinion 
starting from material ethics of values, scheler conciliates cultural 
demand of pluralism and ethical (and juridical) demand of universalism. a 
contribution to the conciliation of these two demands is given by schelerian 
concept of “reality transcendence on experience”, according to which 
the world always reveals new aspects of value that people and cultures 
are called to answer. from schelerian point of view, possibility of a plural 
universalism is embodied by the existence of a “good in itself for me”: not 
“for” me (person or culture) something is good “in itself” (relativism), 
but something is good “for me” independently from the fact that i know 
it (realism) and in the limits of minimal universal obligations given by 
reciprocal respect (“apriorical structure of the world” (Scheler 1916, 769)). 
4  The adjective ‘eudemonological’ appears for the first time in Rosmini (1841-1845).
5  hersch (1947).
6  See Scheler (1955).
7  See Simonotti (2008).
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